Category Archives: value theory

Duration in Desire Satisfactionism

Where I come from, there are two main theories of welfare value: Hedonism, and Desire Satisfactionism. Typical versions of hedonism about value say that things are going well (for you, in the world, in this situation, in the consequence of … Continue reading

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Two Conceptions of Justice

Whether or not a situation is just depends on whether or not the people involved get what they deserve. Justice is, obviously, a subject of great moral concern–it is of vital moral importance, for example, that undeserved suffering be minimized. … Continue reading

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The Possibility of Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being

There is a long-standing and persistent problem concerning interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In its strongest versions, the allegation is that it is literally not possible to make useful comparisons of the happiness or well-being of different persons (or, even the … Continue reading

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Against Geach and Thomson on Goodness

Peter Geach has a well-known argument that there are no legitimate predicative uses of ‘is good,’ and that this suggests that there is no impersonal, perspective-neutral sort of value of the kind regarded as important by e.g. utilitarians and Moorean … Continue reading

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A Dispute Between Kraut and Moore Regarding Welfare and “Impersonal” Value

In this paper I’m writing about perspective-neutral value I address a dispute between Moore and Kraut concerning the relationship between welfare value–that is, the kind of goodness that relates to how well a person is doing–and impersonal, perspective-neutral value. And … Continue reading

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An Old-Fashioned Argument for An Unpopular View

I’m working on a paper about whether or not all values are perspective dependent. People like Geach, Foot, Thomson, and Kraut have argued that all values inherently involve someone or something’s perspective, and so there is no such thing as … Continue reading

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